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Reflecting Critically on Contemporary Social Pathologies: Social Work and the 
‘Good Life’ 
It is incontrovertible that the challenges of contemporary social life have reached a new 
crescendo. International terrorism, migration, environmental decline, a resurgence in 
nationalism, and the vagaries of the neo-liberal market, combine to present radically novel 
forms of insecurity, not only for the dispossessed but also the affluent (Wilkinson and Pickett, 
20??). Within the context of these seismic changes, social workers strive to maintain values 
of person-centred care and social justice, sometimes swimming against the tide of 
retrogressive social policy, debilitating programmes of austerity, and the retrenchment of 
welfare provision (refs.). Yet, in a more enabling vein, the domain of the ‘social’ is where 
identity politics, and debates about morality, freedom, and the ‘good life’, are critically teased 
out (refs.). Because social work is strategically positioned in the interstice between the state 
and civil society (ref.), it can contribute meaningfully to such issues and debates. 
As a way of deepening our understanding of these challenges and opportunities, I examine 
Axel Honneth’s mid-period oeuvre which reflects on the nature of social pathologies in 
contemporary society (refs.). In short, social pathologies encumber, curtail and frustrate the 
attainment of the ‘good life’: the fulfilment of self-realization and happiness. Critically, they 
debase personhood and optimal identity-formation through socially reproduced processes of 
misrecognition. Embracing this definition, we will consider Honneth’s description of four core, 
contemporary, social pathologies. They have been categorised helpfully by Zurn (2015) as: (i) 
invisibilization, (ii) instrumental rationalization, (iii) reification and (iv) organised self-
realization. While Honneth has discussed other manifestations of social pathology elsewhere 
(for example, restricted understandings of human freedom, ref.), this particular suite has 
been chosen as they pose distinct and pressing challenges for service users and the social 
work profession. 
So far, Honneth’s enunciation of these social phenomena has garnered little attention from 
the social work academy. Instead, a small number of commentators have concentrated on 
the tenets of his earlier, seminal text, The Struggle for Recognition (1995). Here, he set out 
his formative recognition thesis with its conditions for optimal identity-formation. This work 
will be briefly summarised below as it sets the context for examining Honneth’s later adoption 
of social philosophy to critique the four chosen areas. My contention is that we cannot 
separate Honneth’s earlier recognition thesis from his later consideration of contemporary 
social pathologies and the nature of social freedom (ref.). The attainment of the ‘good life’ 
depends on subjects achieving a healthy sense of self through social institutions that sustain 
and promote appropriate relations of mutual recognition.  
Yet, even though Honneth has shown a percipient awareness of key social pathologies in 
present-day social experience, I argue that there is another modern-day, social pathogen that 
he has not addressed sufficiently: that is, the ‘financialization’ of social life (refs. – see 
Martina). By this I mean, the way in which contemporary relations, interests, ambitions and 
transactions, under neo-liberalism, have become colonised by financial concerns, risks, 
acquisitive drives and the pervasive anxiety of debt. Financialization directs the ‘self-in-
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making(money)’ but, in doing so, stifles self-actualisation. Aesthetic and moral development, 
within the ‘lifeworld’ of informal inter-personal relations, are thwarted because this particular 
social pathology elevates material preoccupations over questions of human value (Habermas, 
????). Citizen-consumers lapse into a false consciousness as a result, taking-for-granted the 
presumed normality of such fixations. Honneth’s relative neglect of this particular pathology 
may be due, in part, to the fact that he no longer views capitalism as the sole driving force of 
all social ills (2008).  
To conclude this inquiry, I consider how social workers can become more alert to these 
pathologies in social life, and take active steps to counter them. It is suggested that one way 
of becoming more vigilant of their presence, is to apply a critical incident analysis framework 
(Green, 2007). This conceptual, diagnostic tool provides a structured approach for analysing 
the societal challenges facing service users, and the social work practices aimed at 
ameliorating them. Critical reflection, used in this way, contributes to the development of a 
socially-intelligent, anti-oppressive practice that is ever attentive to the nature of the ‘social’ 
and how it can constrict human freedoms and aspirations for the good life. In all of this, the 
aim is to help social workers become more effective social diagnosticians, ‘knowing that many 
personal troubles cannot be solved merely as troubles, but must be understood in terms of 
public issues’ (Mills, 1959, p. 226). 
Honneth, Recognition and Social Work 
My contention is that, when prevailing social conditions, in the form of social pathologies, 
impede or frustrate optimal human development and identity-formation, they involve the 
misrecognition of subjects in some inexorable way. That is why it is vital to briefly rehearse 
Honneth’s foundational recognition thesis as a context for apprehending the nature of these 
social currents. Moreover, it is imperative to review how such ideas have been received by 
the social work academy including the critiques and plaudits that various commentators have 
proffered. Only by doing so can we appreciate the full significance of Honneth’s more mature 
work for anti-oppressive, social work practice. 
Honneth’s recognition thesis advocates nothing less than a view of the moral basis of human 
sociality and its connection with the perils and potentials of contemporary social life. His 
primary concern was the alleviation of everyday misery in the form of humiliation, disrespect, 
social deprivation, unemployment, social isolation, poverty, the obsolescence of rural 
communities and social exclusion. In all these types of suffering a normative principle had 
been violated; that is, there had been a misrecognition of the human subject’s feelings at a 
primal, anthropological level. Honneth addressed these themes by synthesising Hegel’s 
(1979) ideas on the nature of the social self, and Mead’s (1967) postulations on social 
development, to construct a systematic, social theory of recognition. He was swayed by 
Hegel’s argument that one’s relationship to oneself was not a solitary experience held in the 
private theatre of the mind but rather a matter of reciprocity. Mead’s theorisation of 
perspective-taking complemented this axiom. This was the process whereby social actors 
imagined, through an inner conversation, how others might be reacting to them. In doing so, 
perspective-taking internalised social norms and shaped social behaviour.  
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With these philosophical premises in place, Honneth constructed the centrepiece of his 
emancipatory project. It suggested that three ‘spheres of recognition’ were required to lay 
the foundation for a positive ‘relation-to-self’, namely: (a) showing love or friendship (b) 
respecting the subject’s rights and (c) appreciating and valuing a person’s capabilities and 
contribution to the community so as to build solidarity. Disrespect, according to Honneth, was 
tantamount to the denial of one or more of these three spheres of interactional validation. 
Moreover, misrecognition provided the validation for struggle, contest and social change. 
What made conflict a moral enterprise, opined Honneth, were the feelings of outrage - 
shame, humiliation, hurt - emanating from episodes of misrecognition. In this way, the moral 
grammar of outrage confirmed the normative ideal of a just society. Pierre Bourdieu’s (2006, 
p. 241) reinforcement of this point is most apposite: 
‘There is no worse deprivation, no worse privation, perhaps, than of losers in the symbolic 
struggle for recognition, for access to a socially recognised being, in a word, to humanity’. 
These ideas have been considered by a small number of social work thinkers including this 
author. Thus, in a broadly supportive vein, I previously applied and augmented Honneth’s tri-
partite model (of love, rights and solidarity) to the conceptualisation and implementation of 
family support ( ); the rise of individualism within western societies ( ); the disabling emotion 
of shame following acts of misrecognition ( ); and the link between recognition and personal 
change ( ). The central argument in each of these sources was that there was a basic moral 
demand to be recognised and recognise others affirmatively. Without this precondition 
applying in social work practice, relationships might suffer to the detriment of a vulnerable 
person’s identity (see also Rossiter’s (2014) work on this theme).  
A number of other theorists have embraced this latter postulate, albeit taking it in different 
directions. Thus, Froggett (2004) described how artistic approaches in social work – 
comprising story-telling, poetry and drama – could assist service users in building a rich, 
figurative life. She connected this imaginative process with Honneth’s recognition 
requirements arguing that art joined people and validated resourceful expression. 
Importantly, for Froggett, an aesthetic turn in social work militated against the 
technocratization of practice. This stance is redolent of clarion calls to reduce bureaucracy in 
social work (Munro, ; Payne, ).  
Complementing this stance, Turney (2012) situated the recognition principle at the heart of 
relationship-based social work. More specifically, she argued that it was an essential 
orientation when working with involuntary service users in situations where children were at 
risk of harm. Turney’s argument has credibility as parents value social work interventions that 
show care, acknowledge rights and identify personal assets (Turnell & Essex, 2006). An 
involuntary response from a service user may well be a reaction from a threatened identity: 
one that has most likely experienced various types of disrespect and misrecognition in the 
past.  
In a further complementary move, Jull (2009) extolled Honneth’s recognition theory as a 
normative yardstick for analysing institutional practices in social work. This conception of 
recognition challenged entrenched forms of judgement that labelled, stigmatized and shamed 
service users. Judgement, it was argued, was often shaped by prevailing social discourses 
including managerialism, individualism and social care governance. Institutions must be 
founded, by way of contrast, on respect and effect empowerment, independence and 
participation (Thomas, 2012). Jull’s work is to be commended, because it used Honneth’s 
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recognition order as a counterfactual tool, to highlight breaches of social work principles 
within institutions.  
As can be seen, such sources have appraised Honneth’s contribution to social work in a 
predominantly positive light. Nonetheless, some commentators remain unconvinced about 
its plausibility.  A lead antagonist is Paul Michael Garrett (2010). He argued that Honneth’s 
theory apprehended human problems from a mainly psychological frame: one emphasizing 
personal deficits over structural causes. If adopted, this would lead to a blame culture in social 
work. It is important to note, however, that Honneth’s critical social theory (as it has 
progressed over time) has embraced a much wider sociological perspective examining areas 
such as contemporary social struggles, socio-political conflicts, patriarchal ideology, 
egalitarian social justice, and socio-economic history (Zurn, 2015).  
This rejoinder aside, Honneth’s failure to attend to the neo-liberal state, how it promulgated 
social and economic cleavages, further worried Garret. For him, the state (in Honneth’s 
theorizing) was peculiarly a ‘lost object of critical analysis, critique and comment’ (p. 1527) 
even though, in reality, it played a central role in generating social divisions, inequalities and 
social stratification. This charge has merit particularly as regards Honneth’s early work. Yet, 
even in his more recent exegesis of the modern, constitutional state (2014), he caricatured it 
as the harbinger of social freedoms. Manifestly, the state was a work-in-progress towards 
qualitative improvement: a sphere that could honour lawful guarantees and enable citizens 
to find their social freedoms through communicative exchanges in a thriving public sphere. 
Hence, according to Honneth, a democratic public sphere and constitutional state together 
‘constituted a form of social freedom by enabling individuals, in communication with all other 
members of society, to improve their own living conditions’ (2014, p. 274). However, by 
rendering it in such utopian terms, the blight of the neo-liberal state, its dark side, was not 
something that unequivocally registered with Honneth. This may be because he framed it as 
an idealization, rather than an actualized reality. In doing so, he also partly misunderstood 
the workings of power in this constellation (McNay, 2008). To be fair, though, Honneth saw a 
vibrant public sphere as the antidote to retrogressive state policies. For him, the state ought 
not to be the primary concern: it was deliberative democratic exchange within this sphere 
that must be the ultimate focus of attention. 
Garrett (2013) has also raised a further set of concerns in the light of the central debate 
between Honneth and Fraser concerning the sufficiency of the recognition paradigm for 
examining different forms of injustice (ref.). Contra Honneth, Fraser’s contention was that 
failed attempts at ‘recognition’ and ‘redistribution’ led to disparate, bivalent kinds of social 
injustice that had dissimilar causes and internal dynamics: the former relating to cultural 
misrecognition with the latter centring on economic inequality. Consequently, they required 
different remedies situated within a two-pronged approach addressing both areas with 
equivalent parity. Alternatively, for Honneth, the ‘recognition’ construct was sufficient (as a 
fundamental, all-embracing moral category) to examine demeaned cultural identities and 
economic injustices arising from political economy. For Garrett, though, Fraser’s critique had 
merit because ‘questions of recognition...can only be examined satisfactorily if fused with 
questions relating to the economy…’ (2013, p. 174). Elsewhere, this was a position broadly 
supported by Webb (2010) when applying the recognition-redistribution debate to social 
work. However, Zurn (2015) has argued convincingly that to link recognition theory solely 
with identity-centred forms of cultural injustice, was to misrepresent Honneth’s overall 
intent: 
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‘Honneth’s substantive concerns have always been wider than this, and he has consistently tied 
his recognition theory to issues of political economy: the division of labour, the nature of work 
and working conditions, the role of the unions and corporations, levels of income and wealth 
inequality, the risk-mitigating function of welfare-state interventions in the economy, the rapid 
progress of neoliberal privatization, and so on’ (p. 9). 
Moreover, Honneth’s rejoinder to Fraser (ref.), argued that the dynamics of capitalist 
markets, and the economic injustices to which they led, arose from deeply institutionalised 
and embedded relations of recognition.  A superimposing recognition order would 
consequently have a formative influence on society’s economic distribution. There is some 
evidence for this counter-claim. Hence, cultural ascriptions shaping attitudes to gender, 
ethnicity, familial roles, life-course ambitions, and occupational tasks (such as house and care 
work) can have a formative impact on reproducing the division of labour, levels of financial 
reward and inequalities (McNay, 2008). In this context, the normative consensus that accepts 
remuneration for work outside the home, yet blithely endorses the ‘second shift’ of unpaid 
domestic work within the home, is a misrecognition irregularity. 
Even so, it is surely disingenuous to argue that the recognition order entirely explicates all 
forms of economic injustice. Because of the intermingling of economic and political elites, 
working at the uppermost echelons of the capitalist state (Klein, 2007), and their imbrication 
in international movements of capital and multi-national corporations, there are macro-
economic practices beyond the nation state and civil society that regulate distributional 
wealth. Joblessness may not be due exclusively to a recognition order gone askew, but linked 
as well with international measures involving labour saving knowhow, changeable interest 
rates, over production and prohibitive tariffs. Taking all of this into account, we can conclude 
from the Fraser-Honneth debate that, while the former downplays the significance of 
recognition for economic distribution, the latter (at times) miscalculates its potential as an 
illuminative concept explaining some forms of inequality, particularly those linked to 
economic outcomes. This conclusion reverberates with Webb’s view (2010) that social 
workers must focus on cultural and economic discrimination if they are to remain true to the 
profession’s core values. 
Honneth, Social Pathologies and Social Work 
Whereas Honneth had previously developed his central recognition thesis through the portal 
of moral anthropology (that is, the ethical commitments arising from human ontology), he 
next turned to social philosophy to explore the nature of social pathologies in contemporary 
society: 
‘Social philosophy is primarily concerned with determining and discussing processes of social 
development that can be viewed as misdevelopments, disorders or ‘social pathologies’…Its 
primary task is the diagnosis of processes of social development that must be understood as 
preventing the members of society from living a ‘good life’ (Honneth, 2007, p. 4). 
Honneth’s adoption of social philosophy to review various troubles within society built on a 
long history of his intellectual forebears within the Germanic tradition who had likewise made 
use of the standpoint to formulate social critique. Going back to Hegel’s (ref.) concerns about 
the limitations of subjective freedom, then to Nietzsche’s (ref.) apprehensions about nihilism, 
and finally moving to the theorists in the Frankfurt School (ref.), with their trepidations about 
the predominance of instrumental reason in modern-day states, we can see a firm 
commitment to social philosophy as a way of diagnosing and remedying social pathologies. 
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To reiterate, Zurn (2015) has enumerated four of the substantive social pathologies revealed 
by Honneth, identifying them as: (i) invisibilization (ii) instrumental rationalization (iii) 
reification and (iv) organized self-realization. 
Invisibilization 
For Honneth, invisibilization can involve the subtle humiliation of another person by looking 
through or past him or her. In this mode, it represents a form of ontological blanking. 
Alternatively, identification with the person might be very dismissive, tacit, tokenistic or 
minimalist. Putting this another way, the (invisible) one becomes not so much a bodily non-
presence to the other, but rather a non-existence in a social sense. Or, invisibilization might 
show itself in a more blatant manner through the disdainful disregard of another. Here, 
people might be put in their place, being reminded of their subservient status due to their 
class or racial affiliations. In each of these expressions, the dominant extol their social 
superiority by not recognizing those they dominate, not showing any of Honneth’s 
recognition requirements covered earlier for optimal identity-formation. There is no positive, 
affirmative stance towards the other, no acknowledgement of her or his moral worth as a 
subject, breaching Kant’s (ref.) categorical imperative to show respect. In human interaction, 
the subtle facial gestures that denote warmth and acceptance of the ‘other’ are withheld. 
A literary case study portraying invisibilization can be found in Ralph Ellison’s (1952) iconic 
novel, Invisible Man. Here, the protagonist, an African-American man living in the 1950s, is 
socially invisible not only to the white people around him, but also organizations such as the 
Communist Party (a body purporting to champion his rights). He is rendered socially 
indiscernible because of his race. The plot mirrors Franz Fanon’s (ref.) study of how black 
people were made to feel invisible in colonial periods. Notably, both of these sources reflect 
Söderberg’s (2002, p.70) impassioned yearning that: 
‘We want to be loved; failing that, admired; failing that, feared; failing that, hated and despised. 
At all costs, we want to stir up some sort of feeling in others. Our soul abhors a vacuum. At all 
costs, it longs for contact’ (my emphasis). 
Such existential longing is taken up by Stern’s (1977) and Spitz and Wolf’s (1946) classic 
studies on childhood socialisation and development. These authors reveal the way nurturing 
parents affirm the young infant, through gestural communication, and bodily ways of 
expressing and showing warmth. Such care provides an emblematic model for how people 
should generally make others visible in a way that fundamentally recognises their ontological 
worth. There are other parallels to these themes in Winnicott’s concept of the ‘mirror role of 
the mother’ and in Cooley’s (ref.) ‘looking-glass self’ metaphor where a person’s identity 
emerges through interpersonal interaction and the perceptions of others.  
In today’s world, invisibilization permeates many contemporary contexts. Hence, we witness 
the invisibilization of sex workers, trafficked peoples, political refugees, poorly paid and 
treated employees in the service industries, and mostly female carers engaged in child-care, 
housework and social care with adults. Furthermore, we see it in migration where racialized 
subordination comes to the fore and in the way homeless people are sometimes ignored. 
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Not only that, when considering social work practice, invisibilization is present in paternalism 
or tokenistic partnership with service users (Duffy, ?). For example, parents - whose children 
are in the care system – attend a case conference but their presence and contribution is only 
tacitly acknowledged by the professionals sitting around the table. For these parents, the 
outcome is a ‘stitch-up’. Furthermore, many inquiries and case management reviews (for 
instance, Climbié plus other refs.) have highlighted how a child-centred focus in child 
protection was missing, especially with young children. The child remained invisible perhaps 
because there was an inordinate focus on the parent. Or the painful reality of child abuse was 
suppressed due to psychodynamic factors including fears of contamination (Ferguson,  ; 
Rustin,  ). In the case of Jasmine Beckford, she remained unseen by the social worker despite 
having a fractured leg. Other examples of invisibilization include the neglect of the carers in 
some mental health social work interventions (Wilson et al, 2015); the strict, unbending 
adherence to procedures to the disadvantage of human relationships (Niemi, 2015); the 
preoccupation with abstract risk calculations (totting up the risk factors) to the detriment of 
concrete human need (ref.); and the implementation a medical model in adult services that 
belittled client self-determination (Barrie and Yuill, 2008). 
Instrumental rationalization 
Instrumental rationalization, according to Honneth, privileges a means-end rationality over 
all other forms of reasoning. It focuses on the most expedient, cost-effective way of achieving 
a pre-defined end but does not deliberate on the value of that end. Thus, whose interests are 
served by that end, whose are marginalised, and how power is used in an enabling or 
constraining way, are not pertinent questions. The emphasis is on the ‘what’ and the ‘how’ 
but not the ‘why’. It therefore leads to a distortion of reason, the subjugation of nature and 
people because the motivation is not necessarily to benefit the human condition, but rather 
to achieve the best cost-output ratio or performance target. Centrally, instrumental 
rationalization is a driving force in modern capitalism and fuels the proliferation of 
bureaucracy, technology and rational-choice economics for solving problems in modern-day 
life. 
As a modus operandi, instrumental rationalization has been widely critiqued by critical social 
theorists including Honneth. Weber (ref.) saw it ultimately leading to an ‘iron cage’ of 
bureaucracy, stifling human innovation, creativity and discretion. Bauman (ref.) cautioned 
that modernity’s adoption of efficient, optimal goal-implementation strategies, displaced 
moral considerations causing ethical myopia or blindness. Heidegger (ref.) warned that 
untrammelled calculative thinking would spawn technologies detrimental to human life and 
the natural environment. There is plenty of evidence to support this view (Klein, ). The 
Frankfurt School (refs.), of which Honneth is a third wave proponent, challenged the idea that 
efficiency ought to be the dominant lens for viewing human progress. Habermas (ref.), a 
member of the school’s second wave, argued that instrumental rationality colonized 
meaningful communication between subjects, distorting their meaning systems. In a 
somewhat different vein, but compatible with Honneth’s concerns, Ritzer (ref.) contended 
that instrumental rationality had shaped the McDonalidzation of sections of society. By this 
he meant that culture in western nations was becoming increasingly homogenised around 
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four central characteristics of the McDonald’s fast food chain: efficiency, quantification, 
predictability and control. Needless to say, Ritzer viewed them as de-humanizing tendencies.  
In social work, there have been similar concerns about an over-reliance on instrumental 
rationality given it has led to a proliferation of procedures, checklists, audit criteria, electronic 
monitoring and regimes of governance. Moreover, it has placed an inordinate attention of 
the ‘means’ instead of the ‘ends’ of social work intervention (Gottschalk & Witkin, 2015). 
Keeping within this vein, Blaug (1995) embraced Habermas’ ideas, to call for a reinvigoration 
of social interaction and relationship in social work, arguing against the dangers of an over-
bureaucratized system. In an evocative sentence, he suggested that it was far better to start 
an interaction with a service user ‘with a cup of tea’ as opposed to fulfilling a procedural 
mandate. A simple gesture such as this satisfies Honneth’s emphasis on recognition as a form 
of care. Payne (ref.) reinforced the essence of this view but more assertively by signalling his 
anti-bureaucratic stance. For him, bureaucracy led to rigidity in social work, privileging the 
organization over partnership with service users. Similarly, Munro (ref.), in her seminal report 
on child welfare in the UK, highlighted the need for professional discretion in the face of 
burgeoning procedural demands. Rational systems and processes were not always apposite 
for novelty or the vagaries of social life: situations which necessitated critical thinking. Lastly, 
Dustin (2016) has maintained that the development of care management in social work has 
shown key features of McDonaldization. Her thesis has credibility as care managers must 
process their work with efficiency, predictability and control. Likewise, as co-ordinators of 
care, they are required to measure inputs, outputs and outcomes.   
Reification 
For Honneth, reification objectifies the subject: it views him or her as a transposable entity or 
tradable portfolio of capacities, as opposed to a subject characterized by a sense of unity, and 
narrative consistency over time. Accordingly, people are not viewed as sentient, emotional 
and intentional beings with their own desires, consciousness, goals and projects, but rather 
as inert  ‘things’ or objects devoid of such human qualities. Reification correspondingly adopts 
a calculative stance, one that asks: ‘how can I manipulate this person-object in order to gain 
from, control it or denigrate it’? The end product is that the individual can be typified as a 
number (every now and then emblazoned on her body), or statistic, or commodity to be used 
in one’s prudential calculations. In other words, people are used and disposed as natural 
resources to meet the manipulator’s own ends.  
In all these ways, reification ignores primordial, time-honoured norms that, at their very least, 
view the other as a subject or fulfil Honneth’s pre-requisites of love, rights and esteem. 
Reification therefore instrumentalizes and de-humanises. The people who adopt reifying 
practices become de-sensitised to others – seeing them as devoid of human, existential 
characteristics. Reification is therefore a fundamental category error with huge moral 
overtones. Essentially, for Honneth, its crucial cadence is a forgetfulness of the need for 
primordial recognition of the other, perspective-taking with the other, where empathy has 
drained away, where the other is viewed as a cog in the machine to be used and abused – 
shunned as it were. 
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Current socio-political events are replete with examples of reification. Thus, the way some 
refugees and political asylum seekers are treated as ‘others’ who need to be ‘distanced’ from 
non-porous European borders, through population transfer and debarment, is most 
apparent. Another prominent example is ethnic cleansing, as occurred in the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. In these contexts, subjects are re-categorized as ‘viruses’ or 
‘cockroaches’ to be cleansed or purged. More mainstream, is the continuing objectification 
of women throughout the world, a theme that is central to feminist theory. For instance, 
Nussbaum (ref.) highlights the depiction of women as sexual objects, lacking subjectivity, 
autonomy, and agency – viewing the woman as a ‘something’ instead of a ‘someone’.  More 
contemporary illustrations of reification are funnelled through digital channels, finding 
expression, at times, in on-line job interviews and on-line dating. 
But what of reification in social work? Beckett and Maynard (2005) take up this theme in their 
consideration of values and ethics within the profession. They suggest that this particular 
social pathology manifests itself in two main ways in social work. First, it occurs when 
professionals and welfare agencies act as a conduit of policies and procedures that have the 
effect of objectifying service users. Practically, this might occur when maintaining procedural 
orthodoxy comes before responses than are human-centred. In child protection, for instance, 
where risk outcomes are much to the fore, there can be a presumed safety in following the 
procedures (as an end in itself), even when discretion and tailored responses fit better with 
ethical practice. Second, social workers can fall into the trap of reifying service users as a 
defence against pain. Situations of severe abuse to vulnerable children and adults can lead to 
natural distress and feelings of being overwhelmed within social workers. The experience of 
sadness, fear and guilt can subsequently invoke attempts to distance oneself from others, 
cutting off from their human experience.  Distancing is reflected, moreover, in the adoption 
of reifying terms, such as ‘bed-blockers’, ‘new referrals’, ‘cases’, and ‘delinquents’. In all of 
this, we are reminded of Horne’s (1999) clarion call to always create the subject in social work, 
by locating the ‘human’ behind the label.  
Organized self-realization 
In many western nations, according to Honneth, self-realization has become a societal 
necessity. This fixation, he contends, emerges from a new form of reflexive individualism: a 
privileging of the ‘self’ over social life, and the needs of the social group. Put another way, 
subjects are expected to express their own individuality and authentically realize their own 
unique nature and potential. In this way, self-realization has become an inescapable outward 
demand rather than an inner expression of existential choice and freedom: a condition of 
societal normalcy that has become institutionalized. Concomitant with this expectation, is the 
pressure to engage in personal introspection to discover one’s authentic self. This ‘turning 
inwards’ by compulsion, however, is an asocial process. As opposed to finding identity 
through social relations and bonds, which Honneth wants to revivify, organized self-
realization valorises detached inner awareness by diktat to achieve insight into ‘true’ and 
‘false’ expressions of the self.  
Crucially, however, there is a psychological cost in all of this, argues Honneth. A potential 
consequence of this structural demand, is the emergence of inner emptiness, 
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meaninglessness, and depression within subjects, most notably when they fail to achieve the 
expected results. Hence, the demand for a heightened individualism and reflexive awareness, 
can place an unbearable burden on the individual: 
Urged from all sides to show that they are open to authentic self-discovery and its impulses, 
there remains for individuals only the alternative of stimulating authenticity or of fleeing into full 
blown depression, of staging personal originality for strategic reasons or of pathologically 
shutting down (Honneth, 2004, p. 475)  
Honneth observes that organized self-realization penetrates both the private and public 
spheres of life. With regard to the latter sphere, employees in work settings are often required 
to be independent, reflexive, creative, inventive, polyvalent, self-aware entrepreneurs. Thus, 
we see the rise of the entremployee under neo-liberalism: the worker who might have to feign 
self-realization in order to maximize her chances for career advancement, and fend off the 
ambient insecurity and expendability that comes with short-term, employment contracts. 
Leaders, and ‘movers and shakers’, within organizations are required to be self-aware, to 
know their innate styles and yet build up new repertoires for managing their selves and others 
so that they vindicate their creative potential as change agents. 
Tellingly, for Honneth, self-realization should not be forced nor compelled. Ideally, it ought to 
be self-directed and initiated. What is more, organized self-realization contravenes the thrust 
of his recognition thesis which states that human identity is first and foremost a social affair. 
Essentially, human identity-formation does not take place in the private theatre of the mind 
but rather in social interaction with significant others. The assertion is that we are social 
beings all the way through, that the ‘I’ is in the ‘We’. 
Other social commentators have mirrored these themes. Peterson (2011) refers to the rise in 
depression in society but views it as a social pathology that ‘reveals the dark side of today’s 
social demand for authentic self-realization’ (p. 6). For this author, the plea for self-realization 
becomes an irrepressible stress factor that can precipitate existential exhaustion. Ehrenberg 
(2000), in a similar vein, argues that self-realization has become an arduous performance in 
which the self is a sacred totem pole around which the individual must dance. Because of its 
unremitting nature, the dance can lead to psychological enervation. Boltanski and Chiapello 
(2005), in their analysis of the changing nature of capitalism, see self-realization as the 
quintessential activity in modern-day life: one that is integral to socialization. If not performed 
correctly, social bonds will be affected. 
In terms of social work, self-realization has been an important therapeutic goal in person-
centred practice, whether in counselling or person-centred planning with service users.  
 
Financialisation 
Summary of social pathology 
Responsibilization, self-reliance and individualism act as an unholy trinity in promulgating a 
culture of consumption, credit, debt, and veneration of the entrepreneurial actor. Such 
processes devalue the actor by reducing him and her to the status of a homo-economicus: a 
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coldly calculated, narrowly interested actor who privileges monetary success over aesthetic 
or moral advancement 
 
Financialisation in society 
- See Martina’s differentiation document; 
- Commodification in society under neo-liberalism ie people are turned into 
commodities that than be bought and sold in the free market; 
- The anxiety of debt 
- FINANCIALIZATION/CONSUMERISM/MATERIALISM ATTENTUATES SOCIAL LIFE, 
MAKING IT BECOME ONE-DIMENSIONAL (CF MARCUSE), STRIPPING IT OF THE 
AESTHETHETIC IN SOCIAL LIFE EG ART, MUSIC, DRAMA, EMBODIED EXPERIENCE EG 
DANCE 
- SEE SECTION ON FINCIALISATION IN KIERAN KEOHANE & ANDERS PETERSON’S BOOK 
(2013) THE SOCIAL PATHOLOGIES OF CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION, ASHGATE 
Financialization in social work 
- Care management; 
- Personalisation of social work; 
- Commodification and social work IE WELFARE ENTITLEMENTS ARE LINKED TO THE 
MARKET; 
- Debt management and social work; 
- BRINGING IN THE AESTHETIC TO S/USERS’ LIVES; 
- Privitization of human welfare services. 
 
 
Concluding comment: As the esteemed author, Marilynne Robinson, lyrically puts it in her 
much-admired novel, Gilead, ‘any human face has a claim on you, because you cannot help 
but understand the singularity of it, the courage and loneliness of it’. Because of this, in social 
life, all cognition should lead to recognition. 
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